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Child abuse did not gain recognition as a significant social issue until
the middle of the twentieth century. In the past sixty years, efforts to protect
children from abuse have grown exponentially.2 Because incidents of child
abuse do not generally occur in the public eye, many have taken an interest
2017 J.D. Candidate at the University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. See Basyle J. Tchividjian, Catching American Sex Offenders Overseas: A Proposal
for A Federal International Mandated Reporting Law, 83 UMKC L. REV. 687, 691-95 (2015).
2. Steven J. Singley, Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Civil Liability of
Mandated Reporters, 19 J. Juv. L. 236, 238 (1998).
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in finding ways to identify victims of abuse.3 As a result, all fifty states have
enacted some type of reporting statute.4
Mandatory reporting statutes require certain classes of individuals to
report suspected child abuse to a designated state authority.' Almost every
state, including South Carolina, imposes some kind of criminal penalty for
6failure to report as required by statute. Although courts in some states also
impose civil liability based on violation of reporting statutes under a theory
of negligence per se, many do not. In some states, individuals will only be
civilly liable for failure to report suspected child abuse under a common law
negligence theory for failure to warn a third party.
South Carolina courts have taken a conservative approach punishing
individuals for failure to report suspected child abuse.9 For example, South
Carolina has chosen not to impose civil liability for failure to report
suspected child abuse in accordance with the reporting statute under a theory
of negligence per se.'o Although South Carolina courts have recognized that
certain individuals may be liable for failure to report under a common law
negligence theory, all cases that have examined the issue have chosen not to
extend liability." In addition, South Carolina's Attorney General's Office
has provided guidance that applies theories of statutory construction to limit
the scope of its mandatory reporting statute.12
Although the majority of South Carolina decisions have indicated the
State intends to limit liability for failure to report suspected abuse, there are
many issues the courts have yet to decide. The purpose of this Note is to
examine the current environment concerning mandatory reporting of child
abuse in South Carolina and nationwide, explore areas of ambiguity that
currently exist in determining whether to impose civil or criminal liability
3. V. DEFRANCIS & C. LUCHT, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's 2
(Children's Division, American Humane Association, Denver, rev. ed. 1974).
4. Singley, supra note 2, at 238.
5. Singley, supra note 2, at 236.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (2012); Tchividjian, supra note 1, at 703.
7. Tchividjian, supra note 1, at 704; Singley, supra note 2, at 247.
8. Singley, supra note 2, at 247.
9. See Roe v. Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 763 S.E.2d 645 (Ct. App. 2014); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. 240, 711 S.E.2d 908 (2011); Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390,
645 S.E.2d 245 (2007).
10. Marion, 373 S.C. at 399, 645 S.E.2d at 250.
11. Bibby, 410 S.C. at 296, 763 S.E.2d at 650; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. at 248,
711 S.E.2d at 912; Marion, 373 S.C. at 401, 645 S.E.2d at 251.
12. See The Honorable Mike Fair, Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2014 WL 3552174 (S.C.A.G.
June 30, 2014); Michael D. Morin, Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2006 WL 269610 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 26,
2006); Dorothy J. Killian, Esq., Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2004 WL 113633 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 7,
2004).
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for failure to report in South Carolina, and make recommendations. For
example, South Carolina should consider expanding civil liability for failure
to report for certain categories of individuals.
Part I of this Note will discuss the background of mandatory reporting
statutes across the country. In addition, it will provide an overview of the
various approaches states have adopted when formulating policies
concerning reporting child abuse.
Part II will analyze South Carolina law as it relates to liability for failure
to report child abuse. More specifically, it will explore how recent decisions
and administrative guidance indicate that South Carolina has adopted a
conservative approach to imposing liability for failure to report.
Finally, Part III will explore areas of ambiguity that have been
addressed in various ways in other states but have not yet been resolved in
South Carolina. For example, South Carolina courts have not provided clear
guidance as to whether attorneys, individuals involved with the clergy, and
parents should be held liable for failure to report suspected child abuse. It
will also provide background on the approaches that have been adopted in
other states. In addition, this Part will include several sections that will
provide specific recommendations for how South Carolina should handle
mandatory reporting issues. Although South Carolina has elected not to
impose excessive criminal liability for failure to report suspected abuse in
these situations, it may be appropriate to expand civil liability in some
circumstances.
I. BACKGROUND
The public has widely adopted the view that children may be unable to
protect themselves or they may be too afraid to report their abuse to
appropriate authorities.'3 As such, the primary purpose of mandatory
reporting statutes is to protect children, not to punish individuals who
actually maltreat children.14 This goal is achieved by imposing liability onto
professionals who fail to report suspected abuse.'5 Mandatory reporting
statutes in every state create some criminal liability for failure to report. In
addition, some states also read the statutes to impose civil liability under a
13. Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes,
Confidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (1998).
14. Singley, supra note 2, at 236-37.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 239.
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theory of negligence per se.' However, there are several states that have
elected not to impose civil liability based on the mandatory reporting
statutes; instead, certain professionals may only be held civilly liable under
common law theories of negligence.s
A. Criminal Liability
By 1967, every state had implemented some laws requiring
professionals to report suspected child abuse.19 However, early statutes only
focused on a narrow range of professionals: primarily physicians and health
care workers.20 States began to expand coverage under mandatory reporting
laws in 1974 when the federal government passed the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). 21 The act provided states with
22incentives to develop more comprehensive mandatory reporting laws.
Specifically, states became eligible to receive federal funds to support state
agencies responsible for providing care for children if the states included
23certain required elements in their mandatory reporting statutes. These
incentives, along with a series of model rules promulgated by outside
groups, have contributed to increased consistency among states' mandatory
24reporting laws. Although states have not achieved complete uniformity, all
statutes share particular elements.25 These elements include: "(1) purpose of
the statute; (2) definitions; (3) professionals required to report; (4) standard
of certainty reporters must attain; (5) penalties for failure to report; (6)
immunity for good faith reports; (7) abrogation of certain communication
privileges; and (8) reporting procedures."26 Further, all states have classified
the crime as a misdemeanor.27
The most significant differences arise when examining which
28individuals the statutes include. In every state, any individual who suspects
17. Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of Legislation, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (1967).
18. Id.
19. Matthew Johnson, Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Laws in Georgia:
Strengthening Protection for Georgia's Children, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 643, 649-50 (2015).
20. Id. at 350, Marrus, supra note 13, at 514.




25. Singley, supra note 2, at 239.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 246.
28. Johnson, supra note 19, at 654.
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a child is being abused may report his or her suspicion to appropriate
authorities as a permissive reporter.29 However, states have taken different
approaches in determining who is required to report suspected abuse.30
Forty-eight states list specific types of professionals, like doctors and
teachers, who are required to report suspected abuse.3 ' Utah and Wyoming,
however, extend mandatory reporting requirements to all adults within the
state who reasonably believe a child is being abused.32
The expansion of criminal liability to include a broader range of
individuals has led to a significant increase in the number of reports.33 There
is considerable debate concerning whether the proportionate number of
substantiated reports has also increased.3 4  Some critics argue that
designating an overly broad range of individuals as mandatory reporters
inundates the system with unsubstantiated reports.35 As a result, legitimate
reports of suspected child abuse are lost in a flood of questionable reports
because individuals want to avoid liability for failure to report.36 It is
important to note, though, that thousands of children have been saved from
abuse as a result of mandated reporting.3 7 In 1995, sixty-six percent of
substantiated maltreatment investigations were initiated as a result of a
mandatory report.3 These statistics tend to indicate that expansive
mandatory reporting requirements are not necessarily the problem; the real
issue lies with the underfunding of agencies responsible for investigating
abuse.39
Critics have also argued that imposition of criminal liability through
mandatory reporting statutes is ineffective and insulting to professionals.40
They argue that "[t]he integrity of professional people ... ought not to be
impugned by the suggestion that criminal measures are required to ensure
29. Id.
30. Megan M. Smith, Causing Conflict: Indiana's Mandatory Reporting Laws in the
Context ofJuvenile Defense, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 439, 444 (2014).
31. Id.; Jon M. Hogelin, To Prevent and to Protect: The Reporting of Child Abuse by
Educators, 2013 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 225, 233 (2013).
32. Johnson, supra note 19, at 654; Smith, supra note 30, at 444; Hogelin, supra note
31, at 233.
33. Victor I. Vieth, Passover in Minnesota: Mandated Reporting and the Unequal
Protection ofAbused Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 131, 136 (1998).
34. See id. But see Singley, supra note 2, at 239.
35. See Beyea, infra note 110, at 294.
36. Singley, supra note 2, at 240.
37. Veith, supra note 33, at 136-37.
38. Id. at 137.
39. See id. at 136.
40. Paulsen, supra note 17, at 9.
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that they do their duty."4 ' Furthermore, prosecutors are likely hesitant to
pursue mandatory reporting cases because they can be very difficult to
42prove. However, the presence of the criminal sanction may not necessarily
be intended to punish, but to encourage reporting.43 Whether the threat of
criminal liability is actually felt by professionals may be disputed, though. It
is unclear whether professionals who fail to report abuse will actually be
prosecuted in most cases.44 Even with the increasing numbers of individuals
covered by the mandatory reporting statutes and the subsequent increase in
the number of reports, there is still evidence that some mandatory reporters
do not report suspected abuse.45 For example, studies have shown that only
46forty percent of maltreatment cases known to professionals are reported.
Therefore, it is possible that criminal sanctions alone may not be sufficient
to encourage professionals to report suspected abuse, especially considering
the fact that individuals who violate mandatory reporting statutes are rarely
prosecuted.
B. Civil Liability
In addition to criminal liability, individuals may face civil liability for
failure to report suspected abuse.47 Seven states expressly create civil
liability for injuries proximately resulting from an individual's failure to
report child abuse.48 In some states, violation of a mandatory reporting
statute may constitute negligence per se so long as the plaintiff is a member
of the class the statute was intended to protect and the harm suffered was of
the type the statute was intended to prevent.49 In states that decide not to
adopt a negligence per se standard, the road to imposing civil liability under
common law can be much more difficult to navigate.50
At common law, there is no duty to act on behalf of another absent some




44. Paulsen, supra note 17, at 9; Veith, supra note 33, at 144.
45. Veith, supra note 33, at 137.
46. Id. (citing David Finkelhor, Is Child Abuse Overreported?, PUB. WELFARE 22, 25
(1990)).
47. See Singley, supra note 2; Paulsen, supra note 17.
48. Singley, supra note 2, at 247. The seven states are Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa,
Michigan, Montana, New York, and Rhode Island. Id. at 239 n. 12.
49. Paulsen, supra note 17, at 35.
50. See Singley, supra note 2, at 241.
51. Id.
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For example, a court will impose liability on a defendant for failure to act if
a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant.3 In other
words, the special relationship imposes an affirmative duty on the defendant
to protect the plaintiff, even if the defendant is not responsible for creating
the risk to the plaintiff.54 Under some circumstances, it may be possible to
prove that an adult who has failed to protect a child from abuse may have
breached a duty to that child by virtue of a special relationship that exists
55between them. However, it can be difficult to establish the existence of a
special relationship especially if the adult never voluntarily assumed custody
of the child. 6
There is a second exception wherein an adult may have an affirmative
duty to protect a child from harm by virtue of the adult's special relationship
with the person who threatened the child.7 It is important to note, though,
that the adult's duty would be to control the abuser, not necessarily protect
the child.58 While other exceptions to the "no-duty rule" exist, they are less
likely to apply to a situation in which an adult has failed to report child
abuse.59
Criticisms of the expansion of civil and criminal liability are closely
related. The primary concern is that expansion of civil liability will lead to a
surge in over-reporting that will inundate the system with excessive and
often unsubstantiated reports, making it more difficult to identify legitimate
cases of abuse.0
Conversely, those in favor of expansion of civil liability argue such
action will provide greater incentive to professionals who still fail to report
despite potential criminal liability. 6' Further, advocates have proposed that
imposing a civil duty will "advance the economic well-being of abused
children."62 Finally, expansion of civil liability may be a better alternative
63than criminal liability because it does not rely on a prosecutor's discretion.
52. Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence: Tort Liability for Failing to Protect
Children from Abuse, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 405, 411 (1994).




57. Id. at 412-13.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 413-14.
60. Singley, supra note 2, at 240.
61. Kearney, supra note 52, at 430.
62. Id. at 429.
63. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 9; Veith, supra note 33, at 144.
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II. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Criminal Liability
South Carolina's mandatory reporting statute is codified in section 63-7-
64310 of the South Carolina Code. The statute includes an extensive list of
65
professionals who are obligated to report suspected child abuse. If one of
the professionals enumerated in the statute received information in his or her
professional capacity that gives the professional reason to believe a child's
health may be at risk, that professional is obligated to file a report with the
66appropriate law enforcement agency. These reports may be made orally by
telephone or otherwise to the county department of social services or other
67law enforcement agency in the county where the child resides. An
individual who is required to report suspected abuse but fails to do so "is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, must be fined not more than
five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.",6
At this time, it is unclear whether the duty to report suspected child
abuse would extend to any professionals not specifically enumerated in
section 63-7-310. There do not appear to be any published opinions in which
a court has imposed criminal liability for failure to report suspected child
abuse; therefore, there is very little binding authority that indicates whether
the list provided in the statute is meant to be exhaustive. However, there are
several cases in which individuals have been sued by the accused abuser for
reporting suspected child abuse.69 These cases provide some guidance
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (2012).
65. Id. ("A physician, nurse, dentist, optometrist, medical examiner, or coroner, or an
employee of a county medical examiner's or coroner's office, or any other medical, emergency
medical services, mental health, or allied health professional, member of the clergy including a
Christian Science Practitioner or religious healer, school teacher, counselor, principal, assistant
principal, school attendance officer, social or public assistance worker, substance abuse
treatment staff, or childcare worker in a childcare center or foster care facility, foster parent,
police or law enforcement officer, juvenile justice worker, undertaker, funeral home director or
employee of a funeral home, persons responsible for processing films, computer technician,
judge, or a volunteer non-attorney guardian ad litem serving on behalf of the South Carolina
Guardian Ad Litem Program or on behalf of Richland County CASA must report in
accordance with this section. . . ."). Id.
66. Id
67. Id
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-410 (2012).
69. See Wright v. Sheppard-Oswald, No. 6:14-4646-TMC-JDA, 2015 WL 6725082, at
*6 n.5 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2015); State v. Cardwell, No. 2012-213334, 2015 WL 5132348, at *2
(S.C. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2015); Smith v. Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 9:06-0185-CWH, 2008
WL 821809, at *9 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2008).
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because the courts often acknowledge whether the defendants were acting
under a duty to report when assessing their liability. The utility of these
cases is limited, though, because they primarily involve professionals that
were clearly included within the purview of the statute as opposed to
individuals who may or may not fall into one of the categories listed.70
The Office of the Attorney General has provided some guidance in
interpreting section 63-7-310.7' Applying standard rules of statutory
construction, The Office of the Attorney General determined "the statute as
a whole must receive a reasonable, practical and fair interpretation consistent
with the purpose, design and policy of the lawmakers,"72 and the legislators'
words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning.73 Further, penal
statutes must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
defendant.74
In ascertaining the purpose of the statute, the Attorney General's office
looked to the Children's Code, or title 63 of the South Carolina Code.
Based on its reading of relevant portions of title 63, the Attorney General's
office found the ultimate purpose of the statute is to protect children from
76abuse by reporting information about such abuse to law enforcement. The
office further asserted that the implication underlying the statute is that
children may not know how or be able to report their abuse without
assistance.77
Despite the weighty purpose underlying the statute, the Office of the
Attorney General still applied a narrow interpretation of the statute based on
the strict reading it is obligated to provide to penal statutes.7 Although it
never explicitly stated that the statute is exhaustive, the Attorney General's
office offered a reading of the statute that limits its application only to those
individuals who are specifically listed therein.79 Therefore, it appears South
Carolina courts may be more inclined to limit criminal liability to those
70. See supra note 69.
71. See The Honorable Mike Fair, Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2014 WL 3352174 (S.C.A.G.
June 30, 2014); Michael D. Morin, Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2006 WL 269610 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 26,
2006); Dorothy J. Killian, Esq., Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2004 WL 113633 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 7,
2004).
72. E.g. 2004 WL 113633 at *2.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 2014 WL 3352174 at *2-*3.
76. Id.
77. 2014 WL 3352174 at *3.
78. See 2014 WL 3352174 (S.C.A.G. June 30, 2014); Michael D. Martin, Op. S.C.
Att'y Gen., 2006 WL 269610 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 26, 2006).
79. See supra note 78.
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professionals that are specifically listed in the statute. Yet, it is still
important to note there is no binding authority holding that the list of
professionals included in the statute is meant to be exhaustive.
B. Civil Liability
South Carolina courts have consistently held that South Carolina's
mandatory reporting statute does not create a private cause of action for
negligence per se.80 The Supreme Court of South Carolina initially made this
decision in Doe v. Marion. In determining whether the statute created a
private cause of action, the Supreme Court examined whether the legislature
intended for the statute to be used as such.82 Although section 63-7-3 10 was
silent as to civil liability, the Court concluded that the legislature did not
intend to create a private cause of action for failure to report because the
legislature explicitly created civil liability based on other statutes in the same
chapter.83 The Court further explained that the statute did not create a
statutory duty in an action for negligence because the statute is concerned
with protection of the public as opposed to protection of individual private
rights.84
Although South Carolina's mandatory reporting statute does not create a
private cause of action, parties may still bring claims against others for
failure to report suspected child abuse under a theory of common law
negligence. In order to succeed on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must
show "(1) [the] defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) [the]
defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or omission; (3) [the]
defendant's breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injury; and (4) [the] plaintiff suffered an injury or damages."8 6
Ordinarily, there is no general duty to control the conduct of another or
to warn a third party of danger. However, South Carolina recognizes
exceptions to this rule "(1) where the defendant has a special relationship to
the victim; (2) where the defendant has a special relationship to the injurer;
(3) where the defendant voluntarily undertakes a duty; (4) where the
80. Roe v. Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 763 S.E.2d 645 (Ct. App. 2014); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. 240, 711 S.E.2d 908 (2011); Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390,
645 S.E.2d 245 (2007).
81. Marion, 373 S.C. at 390, 645 S.E.2d at 245.
82. Id. at 396-97, 645 S.E.2d at 248.
83. Id. at 397, 645 S.E.2d at 248-49.
84. Id. at 398, 645 S.E.2d at 249.
85. Id. at 400, 645 S.E.2d at 250.
86. Id
87. Id
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defendant negligently or intentionally creates the risk; and (5) where a
statute imposes a duty on the defendant." South Carolina courts have been
reluctant to impose a duty to act for failure to report suspected child abuse or
to warn potential future victims.89
In Marion, the court found that the abuser's psychiatrist was not civilly
liable for failing to report her patient's activities to authorities or for failing
to warn potential future victims of his predilection toward child abuse.90 The
plaintiff brought suit against Dr. Robert Marion for sexual abuse and against
Dr. Carol Graf for failing to report to authorities or warn future victims of
Dr. Marion.91 Dr. Marion sexually abused the plaintiff for several years
starting in 1999.92 Prior to the abuse, Dr. Marion received treatment from
Dr. Graf for his predilection toward child abuse.93 Plaintiff alleged Dr. Graf
was negligent for breaching her duty to warn reasonably foreseeable future
minor patients of Dr. Marion by virtue of the special relationship
exception.94 The court noted that the special relationship exception applies
when the defendant "'has the ability to monitor, supervise and control an
individual's conduct' and when 'the individual has made a specific threat of
harm directed at a specific individual."' 95 Accordingly, the court rejected the
plaintiffs argument, finding the plaintiff failed to allege a specific threat
against the plaintiff sufficient to create a duty to warn.96
Similarly, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Supreme
Court of South Carolina found Wal-Mart was not civilly liable for failure to
report suspected child abuse based on images of such abuse contained in
photos developed in its store.97 The plaintiff in this case brought pictures of
evidence of her nephew's physical abuse to be developed to Wal-Mart.9
Plaintiff intended to show the pictures to the Department of Social
Services.99 Wal-Mart destroyed the pictures based on a policy against
8 8. Id.
89. See Roe v. Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 763 S.E.2d 645 (Ct. App. 2014); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. 240, 711 S.E.2d 908 (2011); Marion, 373 S.C. at 390, 645
S.E.2d at 245.
90. Marion, 373 S.C. at 401, 645 S.E.2d at 250.
91. Id. at 393, 645 S.E.2d at 246.
92. Id. at 394, 645 S.E.2d at 247.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 400, 645 S.E.2d at 250.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 401, 645 S.E.2d at 251.
97. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. 240, 242, 711 S.E. 2d 908, 909,
(2011).
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developing pictures with nudity.'00 Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of her
nephew against Wal-Mart for failing to report the physical abuse based on
the pictures after she discovered her nephew's father also began to sexually
abuse her nephew.'0' First, the court recognized that although Wal-Mart's
actions violated section 63-7-3 10 of the South Carolina Code, this statute did
not create a private right of action against Wal-Mart for failure to report
suspected abuse based on the holding in Marion.102 The Court further held
that Wal-Mart did not breach any duty to the victim for failing to report the
suspected abuse.103 The Court found that Wal-Mart did not have a special
relationship "with either the victim or his father because it did not have the
ability to monitor, supervise, or control either,"104 and the court did not think
any of the other exceptions to the no-duty to act rule applied. os
The 2014 decision in Roe v. Bibby further demonstrates the trend against
finding civil liability for failure to report suspected child abuse. o0 The
plaintiff in Bibby brought suit on behalf of her children, who were abused by
their neighbor, against the wife of said neighbor for failure to warn of her
husband's past sexual abuse.0 7 Much like the previous cases, the court held
that the abuser's wife did not have a duty to warn under the special
relationship exception because she did not have the ability to monitor,
supervise, or control her husband due to the fact she had a full-time job and
was not always home when the children would visit.o The court took a step
further, though, by emphasizing the fact that this case does not involve
commercial childcare.109 This statement implies that absent some kind of
commercial arrangement, the court would be extremely reluctant to impose
civil liability for failure to warn.
Taken together, these cases indicate that a South Carolina court is
extremely unlikely to impose civil liability for failure to report suspected
child abuse to law enforcement authorities. Even if the courts may recognize
some exceptions to the general rule that an individual has no duty to warn or
control the actions of a third party, such a duty will not be imposed unless
there is a very specific threat, to a specific individual, and the individual has
sufficient control over the abuser. Even if these requirements were met in a
100. Id.
101. Id. at 243, 711 S.E.2d at 910.
102. Id. at244-46, 711 S.E.2dat910-11.
103. Id. at 247, 711 S.E.2d at 912.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Roe v. Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 290, 763 S.E. 2d 645, 647 (Ct. App. 2014).
107. Id. at 291, 763 S.E.2d at 647.
108. Id. at 295-96, 763 S.E.2d at 649-50.
109. Id. at 296, 763 S.E.2d at 650.
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given case, the defendant would not have the duty to report the suspected
abuse to law enforcement; instead, he or she would have a duty to either
control the behavior of the abuser, or warn the guardians of the child
directly. This practice raises obvious concerns when parents are the
suspected abusers.
III. AREAS OF UNCERTAIN LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
Although recent South Carolina decisions tend to take a conservative
approach to imposing criminal and civil liability for failure to report child
abuse, there are still several areas of uncertainty South Carolina courts need
to address. These areas include individuals involved with the clergy,
attorneys, and parents. The law is unclear concerning whether these
individuals would be held criminally or civilly liable for failure to report
suspected child abuse in South Carolina. Other states have dealt with these
determinations in various ways, and each category of reporter provides its
own unique issues that deserve individual consideration. In deciding whether
to impose liability for failure to report, South Carolina courts must balance
the ultimate goal of protecting South Carolina's children from abuse against
other interests of maintaining confidentiality, privilege, and familial rights.
A. Attorneys
1. Background
States have adopted various approaches in determining whether an
attorney has a duty to report suspected child abuse."o Some states have
designated attorneys as mandatory reporters or suspended attomey-client
privilege in such situations." Others have explicitly stated that attorneys are
not required to report suspected abuse,12 and some who do not reference
attorneys at all in their mandatory reporting statutes, or impose a duty onto
110. See Alison Beyea, Competing Liabilities: Responding to Evidence of Child Abuse
That Surfaces During the Attorney-Client Relationship, 51 ME. L. REv. 269, 290-91 (1999);
Camile Glasscock Dubose & Cathy 0. Morris, The Attorney As Mandatory Reporter, 68 TEX.
B.J. 208, 210 (2005); Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Salt in the Wounds: Why Attorneys Should
Not Be MandatedReporters ofChildAbuse, 36 N.M. L. REV. 125, 126-28 (2006).
111. See Beyea, supra note 110, at 290-91; Dubose & Morris, supra note 110, at 210;
Lockie, supra note 110, at 127-28.
112. See Beyea, supra note 110, at 290-91; Dubose & Morris, supra note 110, at 210;
Lockie, supra note 110, at 127-28.
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every individual to report suspected child abuse.113 In states where
obligations are unclear, attorneys are challenged with navigating conflicting
legal and ethical obligations in determining whether to report child abuse.
Under Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys
are obligated to keep client communications confidential.14 As a result,
attorneys may face violating Rule 1.6 if they report suspected child abuse
based on information they obtained through representation of a client."'
Although there is an exception to Rule 1.6 in which an attorney may break
confidentiality in order to "prevent a client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm," this exception would only apply in situations where the
attorney was representing the abuser, not victims or witnesses to abuse.
Attorneys' communications with their clients in the course of
representation are also subject to privilege, which means those
communications may not be entered as evidence in court.' '1 Although this
privilege would not necessarily prevent an attorney from reporting suspected
abuse, it would prevent the attorney from testifying in removal or criminal
proceedings."' While this may seem like an unfair rule, there are various
important justifications for preserving confidentiality of attorney-client
communications.
Confidentiality and privilege rules were developed to encourage full and
frank communications between clients so as to assure effective
representation and advocacy."9 In addition, victims and third party
witnesses may have particular needs for keeping their disclosures private.120
Some have argued that attorneys should not be mandatory reporters of child
abuse because maintaining confidentiality may empower clients who are
involved in the justice system or protect victims of domestic violence from
losing parental rights or facing retaliation from abusive spouseS.12 Further,
113. See Beyea, supra note 110, at 290-91; Dubose & Morris, supra note 110, at 210;
Lockie, supra note 110, at 127-28.
114. Beyea, supra note 110, at 282 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6
(1997)).
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (1997); Beyea, supra note 110, at
280, 282-83.
116. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (1997); Beyea, supra note 110, at
283
117. See Dubose & Morris, supra note 110, at 211; Lockie, supra note 110, at 130.
118. Beyea, supra note 110, at 281-82.
119. Lockie, supra note 110, at 130 (citing UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389-91 (1981)).
120. See id. at 131.
121. See id. at 141, 148-5 1.
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critics have argued that the strong policy interest in maintaining
confidentiality significantly outweighs any potential benefits that would
result from an increase in reporting.122 For example, lawyers may not be as
qualified to ascertain legitimate signs of abuse as doctors or mental health
professionals. 12 As a result, imposing a duty onto attorneys to report
suspected abuse would merely lead to an increase in unreliable reports,
thereby flooding an already over-exhausted system.124
Those who favor assigning attorneys as mandatory reporters argue the
privilege that exists between attorneys and clients is not substantially
different from the privilege that exists between doctors and patients; as such,
attorneys should not be exempted from mandatory reporting statutes.125
Further, proponents argue the current exception to Rule 1.6 should be
expanded to allow attorneys to disclose when they reasonably believe any
individual will commit a crime that result in significant bodily harm, not just
the client.126 Supporters of abrogating confidentiality and privilege also
point to studies indicating that under-reporting of child abuse is still a major
problem under the current mandatory reporting scheme, and as such,
criminal and civil liability should be expanded to include a larger array of
individuals. 127
Others have taken a moderate approach, arguing attorneys should be
able to disclose client communications related to allegations of child abuse
without facing disciplinary measures, but they should not be required to do
so. 12 Such an approach would allow attorneys to abrogate their ethical duty
to maintain confidentiality when maintaining those confidences would
amount to great injustice.129 As such, attorneys would have the discretion to
determine whether the harms of disclosure will substantially outweigh the
possibility that a child is being abused.30
122. See id. at 131.
123. Beyea, supra note 110, at 294.
124. Id.
125. Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes,
Confidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 538 (1998).
126. See id. at 540-41.
127. See Kearney, supra note 52, at 430; contra Beyea, supra note 110, at 292-94.
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2. South Carolina
South Carolina does not explicitly designate attorneys as mandatory
reporters of child abuse.131 Therefore, based on the guidance provided by the
Attorney General's Office and the rules of statutory construction, it seems
unlikely South Carolina would impose criminal liability on an attorney for
failure to report.132
Further, South Carolina' legislature has explicitly excluded attorney-
client privilege from its abrogation of privileged communications for the
purpose of reporting suspected abuse.133 As such, communications between
an attorney and his or her client will not be admissible in court unless the
client waives the privilege.134
Based on existing South Carolina case law, it also seems unlikely a
court in South Carolina would find an attorney civilly liable for failure to
report suspected abuse.135 Courts have been hesitant to find a special
relationship sufficient to impose a duty to warn or act to prevent the actions
of a third party unless an individual has sufficient ability to control the
behavior of the individual or identify a specific threat.136 Because South
Carolina's Supreme Court is reluctant to impose any form of civil liability
for failure to report child abuse, and attorneys face additional ethical
complications involved with attorney disclosure, it is unlikely a court would
find an attorney liable for failing to report suspected abuse.
3. Recommendations
Given the unique ethical obligations of attorneys, it seems inappropriate
to impose liability for failing to disclose client communications concerning
child abuse. As such, South Carolina courts should not read S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-310 to apply to attorneys who learn about possible child abuse during
the course of representing a client. Nevertheless, that does not mean
attorneys should be barred from disclosing such information under the rules
of professional conduct. At this point, without guidance, attorneys may be
131. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (2012).
132. See The Honorable Mike Fair, Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2014 WL 3352174 (S.C.A.G.
June 30, 2014); Michael D. Morin, Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2006 WL 269610 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 26,
2006); Dorothy J. Killian, Esq., Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2004 WL 113633 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 7,
2004).
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-420 (2012).
13 4. Id.
135. See supra Part II.A.
13 6. Id.
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confused about how to comply with the South Carolina Rules of
Professional Conduct if they want to report suspected abuse. In order to
clarify attorney's responsibilities, South Carolina should adopt the moderate
approach outlined above. While the ethical considerations underlying
privilege and confidentiality may make it inappropriate to impose civil or
criminal liability for failure to report, attorneys should be able to use their




In recent years, many states have addressed whether to include clergy
members as mandatory reporters.137 In doing so, some states have been more
conservative in maintaining clergy-penitent privilege than others.13 Twenty-
three states have added clergy members to their list of mandatory reporters,
but still protect communication that falls within clergy-penitent privilege.139
Two states have listed clergy members as mandatory reporters without such
protection.140 Ten states designate specific professionals as mandatory
137. Julie M. Arnold, "Divine" Justice and the Lack of Secular Intervention: Abrogating
the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in Mandatory Reporting Statutes to Combat Child Sexual
Abuse, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 849, 878 (2008) (citing Christopher R. Pudelski, The Constitutional
Fate of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a Post-Smith
World, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 713 (2004)); Paul Winters, Whom Must the Clergy Protect?
The Interests of at-Risk Children in Conflict with Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DEPAUL L.
REV. 187, 189 (2012) (citing H.R. Transcription Debate, 92nd Gen. Assembly, 135th
Legislative Day, at 17 (statement of Rep. Lyons) (Ill. May 23, 2002)).
138. Arnold, supra note 137, at 882 (footnote omitted).
139. Winters, supra note 137, at 190 (citing ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2009); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-402 (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 11165.7, 11166 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-304, 13-90-107 (2012); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2011); 325 Ill. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010); 735 Ill. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803
(2010); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. ART. 603 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4011-A (2004 &
Supp. 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 21, 51A (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.623,
722.631 (2013); MINN. STAT.§§ 626.556, 595.02 (2009); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353
(2008); MIss. R. EvID. 505 (2011); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.115, 352.400 (2000 & Supp.
2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220 (2012); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (LexisNexis 2011
& Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2010); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-310, 63-7-420 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (West 2007); Wis.
STAT. § 48.981 (2011)).
140. Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:29, 169-C:32 (2002); W. VA. CODE
§§ 49-6A-2, 49-6A-7 (2002)).
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reporters, but do not include clergy members in their lists.141 Of the states
that designate all individuals as mandatory reporters, seven abrogate clergy-
penitent privilege within the context of reporting and eight protect the
* * 142privilege.
States' reluctance to abrogate clergy-penitent privilege is deeply rooted
within American custom.143 All fifty states have codified some form of
protection for clergy-penitent communication.144 There is some
disagreement, however, concerning who qualifies as a "clergy member" for
purposes of applying the privilege.145 Almost half of the states agree a clergy
member is a "priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of
a church or of a religious denomination or religious" organization.146
However, some complications may arise in determining whether an
individual is acting within his role as a spiritual counselor, thereby giving
rise to the privilege or whether an individual actually qualifies as a "similar
functionary of a church" so as to qualify as a clergyman. 147 For example,
members of the clergy are often well recognized within the community;
what are the rules for establishing whether interactions qualify as social or
spiritual?14 8 Further, there are many individuals who may serve important
roles within a church, like deacons, but it is unclear whether they qualify as
a clergy members. 149
Clergy-penitent privilege may also raise some constitutional concerns
within this context. Critics argue that abrogation of the privilege may qualify
as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.15 0 However, recent decisions
141. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903
(2006); D.C. CODE § 4-1321.02 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 350-1.1 (2008 & Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE § 232.69 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2223
(2011); N.Y. SOCIAL SERVICES LAW § 413 (McKinney 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-
3 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2010)).
142. Id. (citing Fla. Stat. §§ 39.201, 39.204 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West
2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-301, 7B-310 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101 (2011);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-3, 40-11-11 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-605, 37-1-403, 37-
1-614 (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (West 2008)).
143. See Arnold, supra note 137, at 898.
144. Winters, supra note 137, at 188 (citing W. Cole Durham & Robert Smith, 2
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 6:21 (2012); Richard Hammar, PASTOR,
CHURCH & LAW 1033-53 (3d ed. 2000)).
145. Id. (citing Ronald J. Colombo, Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the
Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 232 (1998); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697-98 (2012)).
146. Id.
147. See Winters, supra note 137, at 202-04.
148. Id. at 203-04.
149. See e.g. 2004 WL 113633 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 7, 2004).
150. See Winters, supra note 137, at 194.
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indicate this would not constitute a violation because abrogation would
result in a statute of neutral applicability.' Conversely, advocates of
abrogating the privilege argue that failure to do so could constitute an
Establishment Clause violation for giving a religious privilege preferential
treatment over other testimonial privileges, such as doctor-patient
* * 152
privilege.
Advocates in favor of abrogating the privilege argue that clergy-
members should be required to report and testify about suspected child abuse
because they are uniquely positioned to learn about such abuse; some claim
clergy members are the only professionals some people will go to for
help.'5 3 In addition, advocates argue the interest in protecting children from
abuse outweighs the interest in protecting religious rights.5 4 By allowing
and urging the clergy to report suspected abuse, the State would gain a
powerful ally in identifying and preventing abuse.55
Conversely, critics argue abrogation of the privilege will deter
individuals from going to members of the clergy for advice, thereby
preventing the clergy from urging the penitent to seek assistance.i15
Opponents may also argue against abrogation by emphasizing the
importance of protecting individual privacy interests.
2. South Carolina
Clergy members, including Christian Science Practitioners or religious
healers, are included in South Carolina's mandatory reporting statute.15 8
However, in South Carolina a clergy member is not under a duty to report
"when information is received from the perpetrator of abuse and neglect
during a communication that is protected by the clergy and penitent privilege
as provided for in section 19-11-90."159 Further, South Carolina chose to
uphold clergy-penitent privilege in civil protective proceedings.160 So, clergy
members in South Carolina only have a duty to report under some
circumstances, and evidence of clergy-penitent communications relating to
potential abuse will not be admissible in court.
151. Id. at 194-95.
152. See Arnold, supra note 137, at 891.
153. See Winters, supra note 137, at 218-19.
154. See id. at 220-23.
155. Id. at 223.
156. See Arnold, supra note 137, at 893.
157. Id. at 895.
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (2012).
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The Office of the Attorney General has released some guidance
concerning who qualifies as a member of the clergy.161 On behalf of the
Department of Social Services, Dorothy J. Killian asked the Attorney
General's Office for an opinion on whether the meaning of the term "clergy"
included "lay pastors, deacons, elders, and/or others who do pastoral
counseling."162 While the Office did not provide an explicit response, it
found that the language of the mandatory reporting statute and the decision
to retain clergy-penitent privilege within that context indicates the term is
meant to be interpreted consistently with its usage in the context of such
privilege.163 South Carolina courts have recognized "the issue of whether a
church official is a 'member of the clergy,' 'clergyman' or 'minister'
depends upon the ecclesiastical doctrines and laws of the particular religious
denomination involved."164 Therefore, it stated, "[i]n light of the broad
remedial purpose of the child abuse or neglect reporting requirements, a
case-by-case analysis to determine the applicability of [§ 63-7-310] in a
given instance would likely be warranted."65
3. Recommendations
Given the Attorney General's conclusion that determinations of whether
an individual qualifies as a clergy member are fact-based South Carolina
courts should adopt an expansive definition of who qualifies as a member of
the clergy under the statute.166 Although evidence of communications
covered under clergy-penitent privilege will not be admissible in civil
protection proceedings, a wider range of individuals will still have the duty
to report suspected abuse.167 Further, the South Carolina legislature should
consider eliminating the portion of the rule that discourages clergy members
from reporting instances of abuse when information is obtained from the
abuser. Although it could be argued that an abuser would be discouraged
from seeking assistance from the clergy out of fear of being exposed, he or
she would not necessarily be deprived of spiritual counsel; it would be the
abuser's choice not to speak with the clergy member. In addition, the abuser
may still seek counsel without disclosing specific facts of the abuse.
161. See Dorothy J. Killian, Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2004 WL 113633 (S.C.A.G. Jan. 7,
2004).
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id. at *5.
164. Id. at *4 (citing Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1917)).
165. Id. at *5.
166. Id. at *5.
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-420 (2012).
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Although this policy would prevent abusers from disclosing to clergy who
may convince them to come forward or stop the abuse, it would still
encourage the clergy member to come forward when he or she does receive
such information.
Further, South Carolina courts should recognize a special-relationship
exception to impose civil liability on clergy members who fail to warn
victims or prevent abuse. Like a psychiatrist, clergy members may be
uniquely positioned to learn details of specific threats to individuals by
virtue of the intimacy of their conversations with penitents. 1 Similarly,
because of their well-respected position within the community, they may be
better situated to control the actions of others.169 Therefore, South Carolina's
court and legislature should take the aforementioned steps to encourage
members of the clergy to report suspected abuse.
C. Parents
1. Background
Criminal law widely recognizes that a parent owes a duty to his or her
child by virtue of their special relationship.17 0 As such, parents are usually
obligated to act to protect their children from harm.'7  However, only
twenty-two states require parents to be mandatory reporters.172
It has been argued that "[t]he very existence of a statute that aims to
protect children, but does not consider the parent's role as protector,
represents a significant break in traditional legal reasoning about the parent-
child relationship."173 In other words, by electing not to impose a statutory
168. See Winters, supra note 137, at 218-19.
169. See id.
170. Angelita Martinez, Parents As Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect:
Establishing an Explicit Duty to Protect, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 467, 468 (2005) (citing WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2(a) (4th ed. 2003)).
171. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1.2, 1.5 (2d
ed. 1986)).
172. Id. at 468-69 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3620; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 903;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201; IDAHO CODE § 16-1619; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-33-5-1 to 31-33-
5-3 (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011-A;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556; MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103;
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403; WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 26.44.030; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6A-2; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205).
173. Id. at 475-76.
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duty on parents, legislatures effectively negate a parent's affirmative duty to
act on behalf of his or her child.174 Advocates of mandatory reporting further
assert that parents should be included as mandatory reporters because they
are uniquely positioned to shield their children from abuse.175 First, children
often rely on their parents and come to them for help. 17 In addition, parents
have a level of intimacy with and exposure to their children that would allow
them to recognize signs of abuse.17 7 Finally, abuse often times takes place
within the context of intimate, familial settings that other members of the
public are not familiar with. 171
Critics argue, however, that physicians and educators may be more
effective reporters because their training allows them to identify early signs
of abuse. 179 This argument is limited, though, because it ignores the fact that
children must be brought to a physician, usually by the parents, before the
physician can identify the signs of abuse.8 o Further, children must be old
enough to go to school in order for abuse to be identified by educators."8
A more significant criticism of parental mandatory reporting involves
the likelihood parents will not comply with mandatory reporting
requirements.182 Unfortunately, parents are often the abusers of their
children.8 3 It is unlikely a parent would report his or her own abuse under
184 ***these circumstances. Similarly, a parent may be unwilling to report his or
her spouse for fear of retaliation or loss of custody. ss However, just because
parents may be unwilling to report suspected abuse under some
circumstances does not necessarily mean they should not be required to do
so. 1 Further, evidence from the twenty-two states that do include parents as
174. Id. at 476 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 56 (5th ed. 1984); Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976)).
175. Id. at 477 (citing Marcelletti v. Lux, 500 N.W.2d 124, 129 (Mich. App. 1993)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 479 (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
432 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
178. Id. (quoting HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, § 9.4 (2d. ed. 1988)).
179. Id. at 477-78.
180. Id. at 479.
181. Id. at 478.
182. Id. at 481.
183. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION ON
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2001, 51 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2003)).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 482.
186. Id. at 481.
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mandatory reports show that parents make the majority of reports of
suspected child abuse.8 7
2. South Carolina
South Carolina does not include parents in its mandatory reporting
statute.' It does, however, include foster parents.189 The decision to include
foster parents and exclude biological parents indicates the legislature did not
intend for parents to be held criminally liable for failure to report suspected
abuse of their children.190
South Carolina courts have not explicitly addressed whether parents
would be liable for failure to report suspected abuse, but courts do not
appear to be inclined to hold that a parent would have a duty to act on behalf
of his or her child by virtue of their relationship alone. 191 In Doe v. Batson,
the court found that a mother of an abuser did not have a duty to warn
children in the neighborhood of her son's abusive tendencies by virtue of her
special relationship with her son.192 Although the court ultimately found that
she did not have a duty to warn the neighbors because she was unaware her
son's abusive tendencies, the court still examined all of the usual factors that
it would consider in determining whether a special relationship existed-it
did not merely conclude that such a relationship existed because she is his
mother.193 As such, a court is unlikely to find a special relationship exists
warranting a duty to act between a parent and his or her child simply due to
the nature of their relationship; further analysis of the facts will be required.
3. Recommendations
South Carolina courts should expand civil liability to parents for failure
to report suspicion of their children's abuse. Although the pressures involved
with reporting as a parent may be significant enough to warrant omitting
parents from being criminally liable for inaction, the State's interest in
187. Id. at 482 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, supra note 183, at
12).
188. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (2012).
189. Id.
190. See supra Part II.A.
191. See Doe v. Batson, No. 2004-UP-335, 2004 WL 6331124 (S.C. Ct. App. May 17,
2004).
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protecting children justifies imposing civil liability in order to encourage
unwilling parents to report.
Often, parents may be the only individuals who are aware of a child's
abuse by virtue of the fact that abuse commonly takes place in a familial
setting. While this can make it more difficult for parents to report out of fear
of retaliation from an abusive spouse, or reluctance to subject family
members to the criminal justice system, there should be some source of
motivation for parents to report suspected abuse.
IV. CONCLUSION
South Carolina's existing attitude toward assigning civil and criminal
liability for failure to report is too conservative to accomplish the goal of
identifying and preventing child abuse. In order to effectively protect its
children in the future, South Carolina needs to engage in careful
consideration when clarifying liability for attorneys, individuals involved
with the clergy, parents, and other individuals whose liabilities may be
uncertain. This consideration should balance the oft-conflicting interests in
maintaining confidentiality, familial rights, and protecting children. As such,
expansion of civil or criminal liability may not be appropriate under all
circumstances. Nevertheless, South Carolina should still consider expanding
liability for failure to report suspected abuse when the situation demands it.
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